Official Spokesperson (Shri Vikas Swarup): Welcome to this press
briefing. We have with us today Dr. S. Jaishankar, Foreign Secretary, who will brief
you on all that has happened in the two days that Prime Minister has been in
China. As you know, yesterday we were in Xian and today we have had very
substantive talks with President Li. Foreign Secretary will be making an
opening statement where he will brief you and then he is willing to take
questions also. With that, Sir, the floor is yours.
Foreign Secretary (Dr. S. Jaishankar): Thank you.
We have just
finished our talks today between Prime Minister and Premier Li Keqiang. This
followed a discussion between the Prime Minister and the President yesterday in
Xian.
Just to give
you a sense of the details, the flavour, etc., yesterday’s talks with President
Xi were for about 90 minutes; then they were about an hour together at the Big
Wild Goose Pagoda; and they were roughly about two hours together at dinner and
the programme subsequent to the dinner.
Today we had
90 minutes of restricted talks between Prime Minister and Premier Li; about half
an hour, maybe a shade more, of delegation-level talks; and then there was an
event to do with leaders of Provinces and Mayors, leaders of regions.
Twenty-four agreements were signed, and we released a Joint Statement. I think
most of you would have seen the Joint Statement, most of you would be familiar
with the agreements.
If I were to
broadly describe the approach of the two sides to this visit and the
discussions which took place, I think the approach was of two major powers
dealing with each other, two major powers in the region and in the world. Actually
in China there is a tradition of using certain phrases to connote the nature of
the relationship. So you will see this referred to in the Joint Statement, it
talks of the reemergence of India and China as two major powers in the region
and the world who will be dealing with each other with mutual respect and
sensitivity, and who will be taking into account each other’s concerns,
interests and aspirations.
In terms of
the relationship again, and this is a very careful choice of words, it is a
constructive model of relationship. What you see in the Joint Statement is
this: Two major powers dealing with each other in a constructive way, now
expressing that in bilateral relations, on regional issues and on global
issues. Two words that came up very often in the conversation both yesterday
and today were, strategic communication and strategic coordination. Again I put
those two words in the context of the two major powers.
Now what I
would like to do is to walk you through clusters of issues so that the Joint
Statement has a certain flow but perhaps this reflects the nature of the discussions
a little more accurately. I think there was an overall sense that we needed to
move on the outstanding issues, but we also needed to develop a more positive
narrative of our relationship and to build higher levels of trust.
If I can give
you again a flavour of the conversation, Prime Minister Modi for example said
that when it comes to our relationship there is no question of going back, but
standing still also was not an option, and the only way was to move forward.
Similarly
today Premier Li spoke of the image of our relationship in the past being of
adversaries and competitors and why today we need to credibly project a
positive partnership. That sense that today the relationship is poised at a
very important juncture where there are possibilities of moving forward again
was felt yesterday by President Xi who actually quoted Chairman Mao about
10,000 years being too long. And he said, ‘Seize the day, seize the hour’. So
there is that sense on both sides at the leadership level that it is possible
for the two countries to do more, that the opportunities are there. Yes, we have issues and we must address those
issues, but that should not lead us to neglect the possibilities and the
opportunities we have.
In terms of
the bilateral political, security, defence cluster of issues, there was a fair
amount of discussion on the border and on strengthening peace and tranquility
on the border. There was an agreement that we should expand the number of
Border Personnel Meeting points (BPMs). At the moment we have four BPMs in
operation: one in Bum La in the Eastern Sector, in Nathu La in the Sikkim
sector, Chushul in the Western Sector, and the Kibithu which was opened recently in the Eastern
Sector. So we will be looking in the near future to expand the number of BPMs.
There was also
a sense that the frequency and the context in which these meetings took place
could be increased, expanded; that both sides would work to implement the
existing agreements; and that the leaderships will pay close attention to the
border situation.
On the defence
side, again there was agreement that there should be more exchanges and
interactions. The Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission would be
visiting India. Raksha Mantri has been invited to visit China. There was an initiative
that in our military-to-military cooperation we should focus on humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief (HADR). So we would be discussing the
possibility that between the two militaries now this becomes a subject for a joint
activity or an exercise. There is also an agreement to activate hotline between
the military headquarters of the two countries.
In terms of
the political level visits, an important visit that we are expecting soon is
from the Chairman of the National People’s Congress Zhang Dejiang whom Prime
Minister would be meeting soon. That was the incoming political visit that we
are looking at immediately.
Moving on,
counterterrorism featured strongly. I think I shared with some of you yesterday
that Kabul and Karachi came up in the conversation, again the sense that this
was a shared threat for both countries and that we needed to work more
closely.
A new element
this time in the visit was the leaders of the regions. We have created a forum
for leaders of regions. The first meeting of that forum took place. As many of
you area aware, some Chief Ministers and Mayors are here. This is in keeping
with the Government’s emphasis on cooperative federalism.
Another
important development was that we have formalized, institutionalized a practice
between the International Department of the Communist Party and the Ministry of
External Affairs, we used to organize visits of Chief Ministers and provincial
Party leaders. In fact Prime Minister himself came to China on one of those
invitations. We have today signed an agreement for a sister-state relationship
to sister-city relationships. So as you can see, the federal, provincial,
regional aspect of our cooperation is gathering ground.
We also agreed
to open an additional Consulate. The Chinese will do so in Chennai, we will do
so in Chengdu. Again that reflects a more intense, a more broad-based
relationship which requires more servicing in a sense on both sides. That broadly was the political, defence and security
side.
On the
economic side - and we now use this term ‘close developmental partnership’ - I
think the most important takeaway today was an agreement that we would set up a
high-powered task force which will look at economic issues, which will look at
the trade deficit, look at IT issues, look at pharma issues, agricultural
issues, manufacturing issues.
There was a
fair amount of discussion on what the problems were, what could be done. It was
a fairly specific discussion in some cases. Some of it took place yesterday
with President Xi, some of it in greater detail took place today with Premier
Li. In this context I would flag, we would be the partner country, the guest of
honour at the China-South Asia Expo this year in Kunming.
There was some
discussion in the investment climate and ease of doing business and on review
of the proposals to establish industrial parks in India - one is in Maharashtra,
one is in Gujarat. An agreement was signed in skills development with an institution
in Gujarat. There was a smart-city exchange. We will be doing exchanges of
pilot projects. Urbanisation, how the Chinese have handled urbanization, what
are their lessons, experiences there which we could pick up. And there was a
fair amount of discussion on connectivity, in particular on the AIIB and BCIM
corridor which had been agreed to some years ago.
Trans-border
issues also came up for discussion; trans-borders rivers was discussed. We
appreciated the data that the Chinese give to us. There was an understanding
that we would be extending the agreements which are now due to be renewed. I
would say perhaps we need a little more deliberation on where we could take
this forward.
Prime Minister
expressed his appreciation of the fact that the commitment to open a second
route on the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra was very speedily fulfilled. It will be
happening next month.
Returning to
the theme of two major powers, obviously a fair amount of talk was devoted to
global issues. Again the broad sense of it, and I use a term which actually
both Chinese leaders used, is a more equitable global order. I think from our
side it was also a more contemporary global order.
Here I will
just flag your attention to some of the developments. One, you would note that
there is a separate statement on climate change. We have a history of
cooperation here. We have a grouping called BASIC. India and China are
particularly close in this. Given the fact that we have the Paris meeting
coming up, our being in touch, working together on this is important. Two, we have set up a mechanism to discuss
WTO issues. There again this is an area where we have both strong interests and
positions, and we need to coordinate where those interests converge.
On UNSC, the
Joint Statement reflects the Chinese support for India’s aspirations. On APEC,
China welcomed India’s desire to strengthen links with APEC. On the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,
whose summit level meeting would be coming up in July, China welcomed India’s
application for full membership. And on the NSG, China also took note of our
aspirations. I think that was for the first time it is reflected in a document.
That broadly
is the sum of what was discussed and what has found a reflection in the expression
in the outcome document. If you have any questions, I would be delighted to
answer.
Question: It was widely expected that the e-visas would be announced
on this visit. Why did that not happen? Were security concerns a factor?
Foreign Secretary: I do not know about ‘widely expect’.
You might have reported it but we have to decide it. The fact is, there was an initial list of
countries for whom the e-visa scheme was applied and then we are expanding it
bit by bit. I think in regard to China so far no decision has been made.
Question: Sir, even while Mr. Narendra Modi said that on the Line of
Actual Control there has to be clarification, what is the sense that you get
from the Chinese really? Is there an unwillingness to move forward? Is there a
resorting to status quo? Why is not a sense of urgency coming in from the
Chinese side as well?
Foreign Secretary: Normally on border discussions we do
not go into details but I think the Prime Minister’s own statement to the press
today reflected the fact that we felt that the early LAC clarification would
help to strengthen peace and tranquility on the border and take the border
settlement issue forward. Obviously their view is not fully in accordance with
us, which is why matters are where they are. But this matter was discussed.
Question: Just adding to that question, was there any response from
the Chinese side to this when he spoke about clarification?
Foreign Secretary: I can only say the issue was
discussed, the relevance of LAC clarification was brought out and there was a
fairly healthy discussion on this issue.
Question: On the economic issues, you talked about the trade deficit
issue being addressed by an high-powered task force being set up to address
some of those issues. Has there been any forward movement or any willingness to
address the access issues that Indian companies, various pharmaceutical or IT
companies have constantly been putting on the table specifically to do with
state on enterprises even China giving access to Indian IT companies? Has there
been any forward movement on that count?
Foreign Secretary: I think the reason why it was agreed
that we would set up a high-powered committee was a sense that there was not
enough movement on this issue. If there had been movement, we would not need a
high-powered committee. So this is an area where actually we have a position
which has been explained in some detail. The bureaucracies have been in touch
with each other. It is not that the Chinese side is in denial about this or
says that there is not a legitimate issue out here. I think the challenge for
us is, when you see a problem one side has proposed certain ways of how you
could do this but it is not getting done or it is not getting done adequately
enough. And that is really why need that high-powered committee.
Question: Foreign Secretary, there was talk about a possible agreement
with the Chinese side on sharing real time actual river flow data to India.
Where are we on it? Any real time data from the Chinese side?
Foreign Secretary: I know that we get data. When I went
to Tibet some years ago I actually saw the station on the Sutlej which I think
generates this. But I am not very sure about the real time part of it, I must
confess. I do not want to mislead you, so I do not want to tell you it is a yes
or a no. But my sense is that there is a time lag here. But I do not think that
is the issue with the data. I think the issue with the data is the number of
days for which the data is made available because it is given in flood season.
And their sense of flood season is different from our sense of flood season.
So, I think those are some of the gaps which we would like to plug early on.
Question: Sir, you talked about how terrorism was a concern that both
of you talked about it. Aatankvaad ek
aisa mudda hai joh shayad donom deshom ke liye ek badi chinta ka sabab hai is
vaqt. Uska zikr aapne kiya aur kaha Karachi, Kabul donom ka zikr aaya.
Baat-cheet mein Cheen ka aatankvaad ke baare mein uski samajh aur soch ke baare
mein kya samajh paaya? Aur isi ke saath is baat-cheet ke zariye kya is poore
ilaaqe mein is poore area mein aatankvaad ke khilaaf joh muhim chhedni hai, us
mein Pakistan ki positioning, India ki positioning, Cheen ki positioning tamaam
muddom par, is par koi baat-cheet hui?
Foreign Secretary: Aisa
hai ki aatankvaad hamaare liye toh bahut badi baat hai aur kaafi saalon se is par
hamaari focus hai. Unke netaon ne bhi kaha ki unke liye bhi yeh badi chinta
hai. Discussions mein baat toh hui ki agar donom ke assessment ek hi page par
hai to isko kaise aage badhaaya jaye. Hum log military level par exercise karte
hain, counterterrorism exercise karte hain. Par voh ek operational level hai.
Strategically isko aapas mein kya karna chahiye, kya zyada karna chahiye, in baaton par discussion
thi.
The
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) also came up for
discussion.
Question: POK mein Cheen ke
investment ko lekar Bharat mein bahut saare savaal uth rahe hain. Kya iska
kahin zikr hua?
Foreign Secretary: The issue did come up.
Question: Did the Indian side ask the Chinese to put a timeframe to
the boundary terms that have been going on? If yes, what was the Chinese
response? And there is an MoU today between Prasar Bharati and CCTV. Would they
exchange maps of how India should be seen and how China should be seen?
Foreign Secretary: On the first question about putting
a timeline, my sense is that this is not a problem where you put a deadline and
say let us try to resolve it by that. I think the problem is too complex and
too serious to contemplate that.
As far as your second question is concerned, I saw the
agreement I think it will be in public domain, I am sure you can see that for
yourself.
Question: You spoke about Kabul and Karachi attacks and the fact that
terrorism was discussed. Did India specifically raise the issue of terrorism
emanating from Pakistani soil; and the fact that China and Pakistan share great
relations will China really send that message out to Pakistan or …(Inaudible)… rein Pakistan in and
ensuring that homegrown terror from Pakistan stops?
Foreign Secretary: I am trying to give you a sense of
the discussion. It is normally not done for people to give you a line by line
readout of conversations. As a sense of a discussion I can share with you that
yes, the issue of terrorism came up; yes, we had concerns which all of you are
well aware of. The Chinese also had concerns; they spoke about it as well. Now
if we and the Chinese are discussing terrorism, most issues have a context and
a real life sense to it, so I do not think you need to test your imagination
too much in that regard. I think that is really as much as I can fairly say in
public.
Question: Sir, you spoke about activating hotline between army
headquarters between the two armies. By that, do you mean the DGMOs level hotline?
If yes, what would be the timeframe of activating the hotline? Secondly,
hotlines were also being discussed between Northern Area Commander and the counterpart
and the Eastern Area Commander and the counterpart. What is the decision on
that? Thirdly, China is reluctant to host our Northern Area Commander, he was
denied visa five years ago. Is there any agreement now that they would be
hosting the Northern Area Commander?
Foreign Secretary: My answer to your first question is,
the agreement is to have hotlines between the military headquarters. Exactly at
what level of the military headquarters, I think needs to be worked out, but
the important thing is it is between military headquarters. We do not have an
understanding on hotlines at the Command level.
As regards
timeframe, I think it will happen fairly soon because given the focus there
was, the importance which was attached to maintaining peace and tranquility,
the fact that there was enthusiasm on both sides to have more border personnel
meetings, you can see that the desire to avoid any untoward incident is very
strong on both sides. If you take that as reflecting a sense of priority and
urgency, I would imagine the hotline would come about sooner rather than later.
But we did not put specific date and a time to it.
On the Northern Command issue, I think there was a time
when there was some hesitation on the Chinese side for some inexplicable reason
on accepting visits from Northern Command. That got sorted out some years ago,
in fact quite some years ago. I am not very sure that it is a live issue any
more.
Question: Ek toh main yeh jaanna
chahta hun, bullet trains ko lekar feasibility study ka joh karar hua, yeh kya
sirf Gujarat aur Maharashtra tak restricted rahega ya uske beyond bhi jayega? Dusra,
…(Inaudible)… aapke Pakistani counterpart ne kaise hamein blame kiya hai Indian
agency ko Karachi ke attack ke liye, us par bhi agar aap kindly respond karein.
Foreign Secretary: Jaise
mujhe yaad hai, feasibility study high-speed train ka joh hai, yeh Delhi-Nagpur
section ka hai. Aapka dusra savaal joh hai, yeh meeting Cheen ke baare mein
hai. Cheen ke alaava kuchh aur prashn hai, toh aap mujhe Dilli mein puchiyega.
Question: You mentioned about connectivity and BCIM corridor. Could
you share a little bit of detail? Secondly, from the Chinese perspective they
see the BCIM corridor as a construct of Belt and Road Initiative. Do we look at
it at as a separate entity or do we look at it in that framework? Secondly, a
short question on Nepal. You mentioned about humanitarian issues developing and
possibilities of cooperation. Are you looking at a post-humanitarian phase? When
it comes to reconstruction phase, is there a possibility of India and China
cooperating at that level in that framework?
Foreign Secretary: In the case of BCIM corridor, my
recollection is that our understanding to work together on this corridor
predates this One Belt, One Road. Whether someone thereafter moves it from this
file to that file is their internal business. As far as we are concerned, we
have a commitment which, if my memory serves me right, we made when Premier Li
Keqiang went to India. There is a Joint Study Group. The Joint Study Group has
held meetings. My sense of it is that it is moving and moving positively.
On the Nepal and disaster relief issue, the idea that we
and the Chinese could do something on disaster relief was a larger issue, it is
not only Nepal. If you look at the last few months, we have had numerous
instances where disaster relief situations have happened. Considering the fact
that both countries have growing capabilities, it makes sense today that at
least if countries with capabilities in Asia work together, when you speak of
an Asian century these are little things which would create cooperation among Asian
countries.
Insofar as Nepal is concerned, I think what you are saying
perhaps is not the right way to look at that situation. I think the important
thing in Nepal is that we all coordinate with the Government of Nepal. They are
the people who are hankering this issue and with whom all of us need to be in
touch. How the Government of Nepal wants its international partners to work out
is something which we will see in due course.
Question: Ahead of PM’s visit here China has vocally came out with
maritime cooperation, especially with regard to silk route projects as well as
our Mausam projects in order to reduce friction between the two countries. They
have also proposed trilaterals with Sri Lanka as well as Nepal on strategic coordination
between the two countries. Have they flagged these issues? Have these things
been discussed?
Foreign Secretary: There are a lot of things which come
out in the Chinese media; I am not sure that you should necessarily take them
as the government proposals. I read the same newspapers as you do, but I am not
sure that these reflect authoritative official positions. Obviously there was a
lot of discussion on connectivity related issues, a little bit less so on
maritime issues, but nothing in the direction which you would tend to suggest.
Question: On the One Belt One Road, can you articulate for us what India’s
concerns are? Is not there a contradiction? Us being one of the founder members
in the Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank, whose one of the sole aims is to
fund these OBOR projects, why are we sitting this up?
Foreign Secretary: I think the answer to your second
question is a no. There is no contradiction. The answer to your first question
is, the One Belt One Road is a Chinese initiative. It is a national initiative
of a country. If any country wants other countries to discuss and collaborate
on national initiatives, it is for the country which takes the initiative to
take an initiative to discuss that initiative. We are open to discussing this
with the Chinese whenever they wish to discuss it.
Question: But they have not put that proposal before us even today or
in the last few days?
Foreign Secretary: We have not had a detailed
structured discussion with the Chinese on One Belt One Road.
Question: Foreign Secretary, you have a separate Joint Statement on
climate change between India and China which seems a little out of place given
that the US and China have already signed the agreement and China has already
indicated it will stick to its emission limit? Did China ask us to adhere to
any emission dates, any deadlines on that? You also have …(Inaudible)… in your Joint Statement on climate change which talks
about China and India will announce their INDC figures as well. Is there any date
for that if India and China were to do that together? Could you throw some
light on why there is a separate Joint Statement on climate change and what it
achieves now that the US and China have already signed a much bigger climate
change agreement?
Foreign Secretary: First of all, I am not sure I
necessarily accept some of the comparisons you are making that they have done
this and we have done this and that is bigger and this is smaller. I will kind
of bracket that and put that away. I think the issue is a fairly
straightforward one. It is an issue on which we have a history of cooperation,
we have a history of communication, we have worked together in this
negotiations closely, and these negotiations are coming to head at the end of
this year in Paris. So it makes perfect sense for two countries which have a
strong common interest, which have a history of working together to express in
some public way that they remain committed to working together in this regard,
that their interests will largely converge on this issue. I think that was the
intent with which we came to this.
In terms of how much, this was discussed in a broad way and
in a broad way because frankly there was so much agreement on it it did not
merit a more detailed discussion. In terms of coordinating on the INDC, I am
not aware that that is contemplated. In a sense these are parallel processes.
What it says is we are fully engaged in our domestic separations on INDCs and
we will communicate the INDCs as early as possible and well before that. It
does not say we will communicate it simultaneously together in a coordinated
manner.
Question: It is a two-part question, Sir. Last September there was a
commitment of a USD 20 billion investment in India over five years. Has that
moved forward in any concrete way this time? Secondly, does this task force on
trade imbalance have a timeline or specific goals?
Foreign Secretary: I think on the investment, you will
have to wait for that story to unfold in Shanghai tomorrow because there is a
business event, there will be business agreements signed. Since we are
predominantly a market economy, a lot of this is actually done with private
sector in India. I would put it this way that we can see more visible
enthusiasm among Chinese businesses to invest in India. This interest to invest
in India was also expressed by Chinese leaders at different points of time in
their meetings with us. How that interest translates into business agreements
obviously will depend on people on our side, people on their side. Our sense
is, some of it is translating and you will see the results of that tomorrow.
We are also objective enough to recognize that we need to
keep improving the ease of doing business in India. That is something on which
we have a very open mind. If there are concerns which are expressed tomorrow
during the business event in that respect, it is something which we will listen
to with a great deal of respect and open-mindedness.
On is there a timeline on that joint task force, no because
the whole thing materialized only this morning that in the course of the
discussion recognizing the fact that we have not made enough headway, the sense
was look we need to do something about it. I think it is up to us now in the
next few weeks to sit down, work it out and decide what will the task force comprise
of, what will be the agenda, how does it go forward. Those things will be
worked out.
Question: Sir, you have talked about China making first time a
statement on our candidature for NSG membership. Given the fact that they were
one of the few countries who opposed our nuclear deal exemption at the NSG,
what does this mean? Secondly, what about the other three export control
regimes, Wassenaar, Australia Group and MTCR?
Foreign Secretary: I think the NSG has a certain
prominence among the four which is why it was picked out. I am not sure China
is even a member of MTCR, so I do not think it makes sense discussing MTCR with
them. That is my recollection. In terms of is it significant or not, the fact
that there is a reference in the document and that this is an ongoing subject
of discussion, I am sure you can draw that conclusion for yourself.
Official Spokesperson: With that we come to the end of this
interaction. Foreign Secretary has to leave now.
(Concluded)